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Moving Towards a Competitive Electricity
Market? The Dilemma of Project Finance in
the Wake of the Asian Financial Crisis
Nan Zhang*
INTRODUCTION
Over the last two decades, the rapid economic growth based
on liberalization of trade and investment has led to the rising
energy demand in developing nations of East Asia.' This dra-
matic increase in the demand for new power facilities has
quickly exceeded the ability of emerging economies to finance
such infrastructure development which is traditionally funded
through public sources. 2 As a result, the developing nations of
* The author wishes to thank Professor Jim Chen and Mr. Weidong
Wang for helpful comments on the article.
1. See David Blumental, Sources of Funds and Risk Management for In-
ternational Energy Projects, 16 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 267, 269 (1998); Richard
Walsh, Pacific Rim Collateral Security Laws: What Happens when the Project
Goes Wrong?, 4 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 115, 118, FN 13 (1999).
Planned Infrastructure Costs in East Asia & The Pacific 1995-2004
(US$ billion)
Water &
Power Telecoms Transport Sanitation Total
China 200 141 302 101 744
Indonesia 82 23 62 25 192
S. Korea 101 32 132 4 269
Malaysia 17 6 22 4 50
Philippines 19 7 18 4 48
Thailand 49 29 57 10 145
Others 25 18 14 4 61
Total 493 256 607 153 1,509
See also Handel Lee et al., Preparing Itself for the Next Century, 65 PETROLEUM
ECONOMIST 19 (1998) (China, for instance, has become the world's second-larg-
est consumer of energy after the United States).
2. See William M. Stelwagon, Financing Private Energy Projects in the
Third World, 37 CATH. LAW. 45, 45-46 (1996); Laura A. Malinasky, Rebuilding
with Broken Tools: Build-Operate-Transfer Law in Vietnam, 14 BERKELEY J.
INT'L L. 438, 438 (1996).
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East Asia have turned to private financing, by permitting for-
eign investors to own and operate power projects.3 The demand
for capital for large "greenfield" projects (projects developed
from scratch without any prior track record or operating his-
tory),4 combined with the globalization of capital markets, has
resulted in the development of competing approaches to ob-
taining financing. Cross-border project financings are highly
touted by both international investors and host governments. 5
This note surveys the basic concepts of project finance in the
power industry, and discusses new developments and challenges
encountered in both developed countries (such as the United
States and the United Kingdom) and emerging markets (such as
East Asian and Latin American nations). Part I of this note pro-
vides a comprehensive background of the traditional risk alloca-
tion structures of project finance, which are primarily addressed
in the power purchase agreement. Part II of this note examines
whether "merchant power plants," a current trend in project fi-
nancing in the United States, provide an acceptable solution to
the problems encountered in the emerging markets, especially
in Asia. Part III of this note evaluates the respective advan-
tages and disadvantages of the traditional power purchase
agreement-based mechanism and new merchant-power model in
international project financings. This note concludes that, at
least in the short term, neither the "one-stop shopping" afforded
by power purchase agreements nor pure merchant plant model
may provide the only answer, instead, this note suggests that
the hybrid approach, which combines the two models, stands as
a viable alternative.
I. THE ELABORATE STRUCTURES OF PROJECT
FINANCE
A. DEFINITION OF PROJECT FINANCE
Project finance is the "primary vehicle for financing cross-
border investments throughout the world."6 Project financing
was first used to fund power projects in the United States and
3. See Stelwagon, supra note 2, at 46.
4. See Anita Ahmed et al., PROJECT FINANCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1,
glossary, p. 95 (Int'l Fin. Corp., 1999).
5. See Jonathan J. Green, Managing Risks in International Power
Projects, in PROJECT FINANCING 1993: DoMESTic AND INTERNATIONAL, at 669,
669 (PLI/Com. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series, No. 672, 1993).
6. See Mark J. Riedy, Legal and Practical Considerations in Structuring
Business Transactions in India for the Conference Entitled: India Power, 3 CAR-
DOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 313, 318, FN3 (1995).
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the United Kingdom; thereafter, its use has grown tremendously
around the world. 7 Economic growth in East Asia and Latin
America and the privatization of many former government mo-
nopolies and state-held enterprises has resulted in the explosion
of project finance in developing countries.8 Although project fi-
nancing techniques can be used to find various project develop-
ments, it has been used mostly to finance power generation
facilities,9 since it is most appropriate in industries where the
revenue streams can be defined and fairly easily secured. 10
Project finance is a complex venture. In a typical power pro-
ject, the participants include project sponsors (usually foreign
and/or domestic equity investors), project company (a single pur-
pose company, partnership or other entity created by the project
sponsors to develop, own and operate the project)," project
lender, purchasing utilities, construction contractor, operation
contractor, and fuel supplier.12 Project finance is a technique of
non-recourse financing that is "not primarily dependent on the
credit support of the [project] sponsors or the value of the physi-
cal assets involved," but rather depends upon the expected "per-
formance of the project itself."' 3 "The credit appraisal of the
project lender is therefore based on the underlying cash flow
from the revenue-producing contracts of the project," independ-
ent of the project sponsor's credit in a traditional sense. 14 If the
cash flows prove inadequate to service debt, "the project sponsor
has no direct legal obligation to repay the project debt or make
interest payments."' 5
7. See generally Daniel R. Bedford & Robert P. Feyer, Tax Exempt Debt in
Project Finance, C133 ALI-ABA 203, 207 (1995); Michael J. Schewel, Jurassic
Sparks! Project Finance Revives Extinct Deals, 12-APR PROB. & PROP. 26, 28
(1998).
8. See id.
9. See John B. O'Sullivan, Chadbourne & Parke LLP: Project Financing
Techniques, in PROJECT FINANCING 1999: BUILDING INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS
IN DEVELOPING MARKETS, at 61, 65 (PLI/Com. L. & Practice Course Handbooks
Series, No. 784, 1999).
10. See generally AHMED, supra note 4.
11. See O'Sullivan, supra note 9.
12. See Edward D. McCutcheon, Think Globally, (En)act Locally: Promot-
ing Effective National Environmental Regulatory Infrastructures in Developing
Nations, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 395, 413 (1998).
13. See Jay Facciolo, Project Finance by Clifford Chance, 11 B.U. INTrL L.J.
165, 168 (1993) (book review) (quoting Clifford Chance, Project Finance 3
(1991)).
14. See Scott L. Hoffman, A Practical Guide to Transactional Project Fi-
nance: Basic Concepts, Risk Identification, and Contractual Considerations, 45
Bus. LAw. 181, 182-83 (1989).
15. See id.
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B. THE ADVANTAGES OF PROJECT FINANCE
1. Non-Recourse or Limited-Recourse Debt Financing
Non-recourse debt financing, highly leveraged debt, and re-
duction of the overall risk for major project participants to an
acceptable level, 16 are the most salient features of project
finance.
In traditional corporate finance, the primary source of re-
payment for investors and creditors is the project sponsor,
backed by its entire balance sheet. 17 Although project lenders
will usually still seek to assure of the economic viability of the
project itself, an more important factor in their decision is "the
overall strength of the [project] sponsor's balance sheet as well
as business reputation."'" In contrast, a typical project financ-
ing is secured "solely by the project and its revenues and is com-
pletely 'non-recourse' to the project sponsor."19 That is, if the
project revenues are insufficient to cover principal and interest
payments of the project debt, the project sponsors do not have
any obligation to guarantee the repayment,20 and the project
lender relies solely on the project collateral in enforcing rights
and obligations in connection with the project finance loan.21
Thus, in corporate finance, should a project fail, project lender
does not necessarily suffer, as long as project sponsor remains
financially viable. 22 In project finance, the failure of a project
can inflict significant losses on both project lender and project
sponsor.23
Theoretically, project financing provides a structure that
does not impose upon the project sponsor any obligation beyond
its equity investment. 24 As a practical matter, however, project
financing is often carried out on a limited-recourse basis,25 espe-
cially in most developing market projects.26 For example, dur-
ing the construction period, the project lenders generally require
16. See ARMED, supra note 4, at 4.
17. See id, at 5.
18. See id.
19. Daniel R. Bedford et al., Project Financing, C749 ALI-ABA 177, 181
(1992).
20. See Hoffman, supra note 14, at 185.
21. See id.
22. See AHMED, supra note 4, at 5.
23. See id.
24. See Hoffman, supra note 14, at 185.
25. See Nagla Nassar, Project Finance, Public Utilities, and Public Con-
cerns: A Practitioner's Perspective, 23 FoRDHAM IN'L L.J. 60, 68 (2000).
26. See AHMED, supra note 4, at 5.
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project sponsors providing a contingent financial commitment
under the terms of a project completion agreement.27 Moreover,
if the risks associated with a non-recourse debt are too high, the
project lender may require various types of credit enhancement
in the form of guarantees, warranties and other covenants from
the project sponsor or third parties to support the risk
allocation.28
2. Highly Leveraged Debt
Another important reason for selecting project financing is
the ability of project sponsors to finance a project using highly
leveraged debt without requiring as much project sponsor equity
as in traditional corporate finance, 29 where the leverage per-
centage is often between seventy-five and eighty-percent. 30 Be-
cause of this advantage, project financing is commonly used to
finance capital-intensive industries, such as power generation,
waste recovery, mining and transportation, 31 especially green-
field projects. Project finance also can take advantage of the
globalization of capital markets, which expanded the number of
potential investors and creditors, created a broader spectrum of
27. See Blumental, supra note 1, at 275; E. Waide Warner, Jr., Standard &
Poor's Global Project Finance: Petrozuata Finance Inc., in PROJECT FINANCING
IN EMERGING MARKETS: SUCCESSFUL DEVELOPMENT OF POWER, OIL AND GAS,
MINING, TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORTATION PROJECTS, at 443, 456
(PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series, No. 1145, 1999).
28. See Bedford & Feyer, supra note 7, at 207; Hoffman, supra note 14, at
184; Peter F. Fitzgerald, International Project Financing: An Overview, in PRO-
JECT FINANCING 1998: BUILDING INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS IN DEVELOPING
MARKETS, at 9, 16-17 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series, No.
1103, 1999) (explaining that "it is possible to allocate some of the risks to the
host country government under credit enhancement, particularly for high-pro-
file projects that are important to the host country's economic development").
29. See AHMED, supra note 4, at 7.
30. See Hoffman, supra note 14, at 186.
31. See Bedford & Feyer, supra note 7, at 207; Roger D. Feldman & Scott L.
Hoffman, Basic Concepts of Project Finance Documentation: Risk Allocation,
Drafting, and Regulatory Considerations for Power Sales and Fuel Supply Con-
tracts, in PROJECT FINANCING 1987: POWER GENERATION, WASTE RECOVERY, AND
OTHER INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES, at 399, 403 (PLI Real Estate L. & Practice
Course Handbook Series, No. 297, 1987). See also Schewel, supra note 7, at 27
("project financings are unusual for loans of less than $25 million and are com-
mon for loans over $1 billion").
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financial instruments, 32 and therefore reduced the borrower's
cost of funds.33
The compelling reasons to consider using project finance are
its non-recourse or limited-recourse nature and highly-leveraged
debt. In addition, as discussed below, allocating the recourse ob-
ligations and the financing needs of the project among a group of
project participants and interested third parties, so that no one
of them has to assume full risks for the project, makes project
financing one of the few available financing alternatives in the
capital intensive industries.34
C. RISK IDENTIFICATION AND ALLOCATION
1. Overview of Various Risks
Because of the non-recourse or limited-recourse nature of
project finance, the complex financial and legal structures, and
the project lenders' reliance on the underlying cash flow from
the revenue-producing contracts over a long payment period,
project financing requires a complex scheme of risk identifica-
tion, evaluation and allocation. 35 The success of a project de-
pends on a "proper allocation of each risk to the project
participant who is best able to manage and mitigate the risk."36
In general, the risks fall into three basic categories: commercial,
political, and force majeure.37
32. Such as equity, commercial loans, subordinated loans, supplier credit,
bonds, export credit agency facility, and multilateral or bilateral agency credit
facility; each of investors and creditors demands a different risk and return pro-
file for its investments or loans, a large project can raise these funds at a rela-
tively low cost. AHMED, supra note 4, at 8-9.
33. See AHMED, supra note 4, at 8.
34. See id; Hoffman, supra note 14, at 181.
35. See Schewel, supra note 7, at 29.
36. See O'Sullivan, supra note 9, at 66; see also David N. Powers, Selected
Issues Regarding Construction and Operation and Maintenance Contracts, in
PROJECT FINANCING 1997: BUILDING INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS IN DEVELOPING
MARKETS, at 143, 145 (PLI Com. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series, No.
749, 1997) (much of the financial and legal "engineering" in project finance in-
volves allocating to project participants various project risks, such that the re-
maining unallocated project risks are financable.)
37. See Stelwagon, supra note 2, at 47. See generally Harold F. Moore, Pro-
ject Finance: Infrastructure Issues in Indonesia, in PROJECT FINANCING 1999:
BUILDING INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS IN DEVELOPING MARKETS (PLI CORP. L. &
PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, No. 1103, 1999); see also O'Sullivan, supra
note 9. (Force majeure generally covers natural disasters. Since force majeure
is not a viable defense in any dispute over payment obligations, a very broad
definition of force majeure, e.g., labor disputes, governmental actions and
changes in law, usually is included in the power purchase agreement to de-
crease risk and uncertainty for the project company).
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Commercial risks include but are not limited to:
(a) construction risks (construction cost overruns, delay in completion,
and failure to achieve target performance);
(b) operating risks (operating cost overruns and failure to maintain
target performance);
(c) fuel risks (fuel price increases, fuel supply shortfall or interrup-
tions, and transportation delay or interruptions);
(d) market risks (inadequate market demand for power, and inade-
quate market price of power);
(e) currency-related risks (exchange rate fluctuations and inflation);
and
(f) environmental risk.3 8
Although commercial risks are common to all types of pro-
ject financing, private infrastructure projects in developing
countries are more susceptible to extensive political risks, 39
such as adverse changes in the law, currency inconvertibility or
non-transferability, expropriation, and possible civil unrest.40
The commercial and political risks of a project in a developing
country must be carefully allocated among the participants: pro-
ject company, project sponsors, the host country government,
multilateral and bilateral agencies, project lenders and other
project financing participants (purchasing utilities, construction
contractor, operation contractor, fuel supplier, etc.).4t In accord-
ance with the fundamental theory of allocation of risk to the par-
ties best able to manage it, the commercial risks associated with
the completion and operation of the project are usually shifted to
the private sector participants and insurance companies. 42 On
the other hand, the political risks are typically allocated to the
host country government, its agencies, and to multilateral and
bilateral agencies providing political risk insurance. 43
Project financing participants allocate projects risks
through project contractual framework and contract terms.44
For example, the parties allocate construction risks to the con-
struction company using a fixed priced, date certain turn key
construction contract (usually referred to as an engineering, pro-
curement and construction contract ("EPC")), which includes de-
tailed performance criteria and liquidated damages for a failure
38. See John G. Mauel, Common Contractual Risk Allocations in Interna-
tional Power Projects, 1996 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 37, 42 (1996).
39. See Stelwagon, supra note 2, at 54.
40. See Mauel, supra note 38, at 55-58.
41. See Samuel Kern Alexander, Current Issues in Multinational Financ-
ing, 89 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 19, 23 (1995).
42. See id; O'Sullivan, supra note 9, at 74.
43. See Alexander, supra note 41, at 23.
44. See Schewel, supra note 7, at 29.
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to meet the milestones or performance guarantees. 45 Similarly,
the parties may contractually allocate the fuel pricing risk to the
fuel supplier with a fixed price, long-term fuel supply agree-
ment.46 Alternatively, in a "pass-through" arrangement, the
fuel pricing risk can be shifted to the purchasing utilities and
ultimately to the retail utility consumers in the tariff.47
2. Market Risks
Market risks refer to risks associated with fluctuations in
market demand and market price for power. These are primar-
ily addressed in the power purchase agreement ("PPA"). The
PPA is the central contract in a typical private power project. It
establishes the power purchase-sale rights and obligations be-
tween the project company and the purchasing utilities, creates
the sole revenue stream for repayment of debt and return to in-
vestors, and guarantees a market for power produced by the
project. 49
Because of the comparative advantage of the purchasing
utilities in predicting and influencing the market demand and
market price for the energy generated by the project, these risks
almost uniformly shift to the purchasing utilities under the ca-
pacity payment and energy payment arrangements of the
PPA.50 The device for allocating the risk of an inadequate mar-
ket demand for power typically is the fixed obligation of the
purchasing utilities under a take-or-pay or firm-capacity pay-
ment agreement.5 1 The capacity payment generally includes
construction costs, project development expenses, fixed opera-
tion and maintenance costs, fixed fuel costs, financial costs, in-
surance costs, and usually all or most of the return on equity
45. See id, at 30.
46. See id; Robert Thornton Smith, Submission and Evaluation of Propos-
als for Private Power Generation Projects in Developing Countries, in PROJECT
FINANCING FROM DOMESTIC TO INTERNATIONAL: BUILDING INFRASTRUCTURE
PROJECTS IN DEVELOPING MARKETS 1995, 183, 210-211 (PLI Com. L. & Practice
Course Handbook Series, No. 707, 1995).
47. See Schewel, supra note 7, at 30.
48. See Mauel, supra note 38, at 52.
49. See John J. Beardsworth, Jr., Financing Power Projects in Emerging
Markets: Power Purchase Agreements and Related Financial Issues, in PROJECT
FINANCING 1998: BUILDING INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS IN DEVELOPING MAR-
KETS, at 89, 93 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 763, 1998);
Robert Thornton Smith, supra note 46, at 226.
50. See Mauel, supra note 38, at 52.
51. See id; Robert Thornton Smith, supra note 46, at 219.
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investment.52 As long as the power plant is capable of producing
the capacity, the take-or-pay obligation requires the purchasing
utilities to pay for a specified, minimum quantity of available
capacity even if they fail to accept delivery of such power.5 3
Therefore, under such an arrangement, if market demand falls
below projections, the purchasing utilities would nonetheless be
obligated to make the capacity payments. 54 The capacity pay-
ment functions as an insurance policy for the project company,
and is designed to compensate the project company for its fixed
costs associated with project construction and operation. 55
The tariff in a PPA is divided into capacity payment and
energy payment components. The primary mechanism for allo-
cating the risk of inadequate market price of power is covered in
the calculation of the energy payments. 56 The energy payment
is a variable payment based on the amount of energy actually
delivered to the purchasing utilities.57 It usually includes varia-
ble fuel costs (both purchase price and transportation costs) and
variable operation and maintenance costs that are incurred only
when energy is produced. 58 The equity investors' return on
their investment may be covered by the energy payment, the ca-
pacity payment, or both.5 9 The energy payment is designed to
compensate the project company for all of the variable costs as-
sociated with generating dispatched electricity; the purchasing
utilities are obligated to make payments based upon the formula
stipulated in the PPA, escalating according to a certain index,
regardless of changes in the market price of power.60
3. Currency Devaluation Risk
Because a project typically generates revenue stream in the
local currency of the host nation, while the project company
must serve its debt and provide returns on equity investment to
52. See Beardsworth, supra note 49, at 94-95; O'Sullivan, supra note 9, at
91.
53. See Stephen W. Stein, Construction Financing for BOT Project in Viet-
nam: Developing a Bankable Infrastructure Project,, 17 NO. 8 E. ASIAN Exacu-
TE REP. 7, 21 (1995).
54. See Beardsworth, supra note 49, at 95. The most famous (and famously
disastrous) use of take-or-pay contracts is in the U.S. natural gas industry dur-
ing the 1970s and 1980s.
55. See Stelwagon, supra note 2, at 50.
56. See Mauel, supra note 38, at 52.
57. See Robert Thornton Smith, supra note 46, at 210.
58. See id, at 212; O'Sullivan, supra note 9, at 92.
59. See O'Sullivan, supra note 9, at 92; Schewel, supra note 7, at 28.
60. See Mauel, supra note 38, at 53.
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its foreign lenders and investors in hard currency (e.g. U.S. dol-
lar); international project financing in emerging markets, which
usually are non-hard currency countries, often involves the risk
of exchange rate fluctuations. 61 If the local currency depreciates
significantly relative to the U.S. dollar, the cost of making pay-
ments can rise considerably and have a severe impact on the
ability of the project company to service its debt.62 Although the
ability to hedge against or insure the devaluation risk is very
limited, the capacity payment and energy payment arrangement
may serve as a useful approach for mitigating and shifting this
risk from the project company to the purchasing utilities, in the
form of linking local currency capacity and energy payments to
hard currency values. 63 For example, the project company and
purchasing utilities may agree in the PPA to denominate the ca-
pacity payment and energy payment obligations in hard cur-
rency.64 Another option is to denominate the tariff in local
currency, it may then be pegged to the exchange rate of U.S.
dollar at a certain benchmark date, and the tariff indexed to
fluctuations in the exchange rate.65
The allocation of risks is a difficult and complex process in
developed countries as well as in developing countries. 66 In de-
veloping countries, the process is substantially more difficult be-
cause there is often a lack of precedents upon which to build.
The comparatively undeveloped legal and regulatory framework
further hampers the process. 67 Although predictable regulatory
and political environments and stable markets combine to pro-
duce dependable cash flow and assure enforcement of the bar-
gain, developing countries may lack such predictability and
stability.68
61. See Stelwagon, supra note 2, at 55.
62. See Alexander, supra note 41, at 22.
63. See Fitzgerald, supra note 28, at 10; Mauel, supra note 38, at 54;
Stelwagon, supra note 2, at 57.
64. See Alexander, supra note 41, at 22.
65. See Blumental, supra note 1 at 290.
66. See PROJECT FINANCE AND GUARANTEES DEPARTMENT, THE WORLD
BANK, Project Finance and Guarantees, in PROJECT FINANCING IN EMERGING
MARKETs 1998 at 63, 74 (PLI Corn L. & Practice Course Handbook Series, No.
763, 1998).
67. See id.
68. See Hoffman, supra note 14, at 183.
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II. THE MOVE TOWARDS A COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY
MARKET
A. DEREGULATION OF ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY AND APPLICATION
OF MERCHANT POWER
A prime factor accounting for the tremendous growth of pro-
ject finance is deregulation of the electrical industry. 69 "The
[most] dominant force in the domestic and international power
sector since 1995 has been deregulation,"70 as a result, free mar-
ket competition has begun to replace the government-regulated
industry.71 Nowadays, most countries count on market mecha-
nisms to direct economic activities and on the private sector to
provide investment.7 2 Greater focus on the private sector natu-
rally results in regulatory reforms and such reforms have in
turn created new markets in areas which previously are the pre-
serve of government activity.7 3
Prior to this development, the predominant electric power
industry model had been the electric utility monopoly model,
which was based on the theory that utilities had characteristics
of a "natural monopoly."7 4 This monopoly model is character-
ized by government ownership, government control, and the in-
tegration of both the generation and the distribution of the
utility.7 5 The state granted an electric utility a regulated mo-
nopoly which possessed all components of the electricity service:
the generation, transmission (the wholesale of electricity from a
generating power plant to the electric utility), and distribution
(the retail side of the electric industry).7 6 Since the 1980s, more
and more nations have adopted a "fully unbundled, competitive
69. See AHmED, supra note 4, at 2.
70. See Kenneth V. Wilson, Electric Utility Deregulation: the Recovery of
Stranded Costs, 33 NEw ENG. L. REV. 557, 557 (1999) (quoting Steven Ferray,
Law of Independent Power 10-4 (release #11 1998)).
71. See Jeff B. Slaton, Searching for "Green" Electrons in a Deregulated
Electricity Market: How Green is Green? 22 ENVIRONS ENvTL. L. & POL'Y J. 21,
23 (1998).
72. See ARMED, supra note 4, at 2.
73. See id.
74. See Joseph P. Tomain, Electricity Restructuring: A Case Study in Gov-
ernment Regulation, 33 TuLSA L.J. 827, 832 (1998).
75. See A. John Armstrong, Unplugged? The Effect of the New World Elec-
tric Power Order on Renewable Energy Industries, 22 N.C.J. INT'L L.& COM.
REG. 449, 457 (1997).
76. See Scott B. Finlinson, The Pains of Extinction: Stranded Costs in the
Deregulation of the Utah Electric Industry, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 173, 184 (1998).
There is a wrinkle in U.S. law. The states would regulate generation and distri-
bution, but the federal government would regulate transmission. See generally
FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 102 S.Ct. 2126 (1982); Arkansas Electric
2000]
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electricity market" model and this move has become the most
significant worldwide trend in reforming the electric utility in-
dustry.77 The new model breaks up the electric monopoly into
three facets: generation, transmission, and distribution; and it
also creates and extends competitions to place "an industry back
in the hands of the market."78 The United Kingdom and the
United States have served as forerunners in the move towards
deregulation.
The United Kingdom was the first country that unbundled
its power sector. 79 The 1989 Energy Act privatized the power
industry, institutionalized a scheme to deregulate the power
business and to foster competition.80 Through launching an
electricity pool, the British government created a spot market s
and commoditized electricity.8 2 Following the United Kingdom's
experiences, Latin American countries, such as Chile, Peru, Ar-
gentina, and Bolivia, implemented similar frameworks on the
basis of unbundling the activities of power industries and creat-
ing a competitive market.8 3
Prior to the late 1970s, the electric utility industry in the
United States was a closely-regulated monopoly, with local mo-
nopolistic utilities satisfying the growing needs of almost all con-
sumers in its service areas.84 In 1978, the Public Utilities
Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) was enacted in response to ris-
ing energy costs and fuel shortages, which required the local
utility to purchase power from alternative generators of electric-
ity called "qualifying facilities."8 5 PURPA opened the door for
privatization and competition in the generation market of the
electrical industry,86 and provided a well-built model for the de-
Cooperative Corp. v. Arkansas Public Service Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 103 S.Ct.
1905 (1983).
77. See Armstrong, supra note 75, at 467.
78. See Tomain, supra note 74, at 829; id.
79. See Armstrong, supra note 75, at 467.
80. See Mark E. Haedicke, Competitive-Based Contracts for the New Power
Business, 17 ENERGY L.J. 103, 117 (1996).
81. See infra text accompanying notes 94-95.
82. See id.
83. See Armstrong, supra note 75, at 467.
84. See Slaton, supra note 71, at 24. See generally Joseph D. Kearney &
Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries Law 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1353-54 (1998).
85. See Deirdre O'Callaghan & Steve Greenwald, PURPA from Coast to
Coast: America's Great Electricity Experiment, 10-WTR NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV'T 17, 17 (1996); id.
86. See Finlinson, supra note 76, at 185; Tomain, supra note 74, at 835.
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velopment of project financing in other industrial countries.8 7
In the 1990s, by enacting the Energy Policy Act of 1992 and the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Order No. 888, Con-
gress and the federal government took another step towards de-
regulation, which fundamentally restructured the interstate
electric industry and promoted wholesale competition through
open access and non-discriminatory transmission services by
public utilities.38 The third step towards full deregulation was
the extension of "regulated-competition to the retail markets" 9
and this was under state jurisdiction. Unbundling of electric
power at the state or local level allows direct access to power
supply for all consumers through "retail wheeling,"90 which ef-
fectuates competition in distribution areas and removes the
foundation for utilities' monopoly power. 91 By 1997, forty-nine
states had either proposed or developed retail competition
programs. 92
The open transmission and distribution access includes two
main models for delivery of electricity: 1) trading through a spot
market ("PoolCo model"), and 2) direct access through bilateral
contracts ("bilateral model"). 93 PoolCo model is a centralized,
mandatory hourly spot market administered by an independent
system operator; buyers and sellers trade in this power pool
based on a single transparent market-clearing price established
87. See ARMED, supra note 4, at 2.
88. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 84, at 1354; Linda Jones, Electric
Industry Restructuring - Consumers Will Soon Choose Electrical Supplier, 40-
JUN ADVOCATE (IDAHO) 30, 30-31 (1997); Wilson, supra note 70, at 570; Cajun
Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v. FERC, 924 F.2d 1132 (D.C.Cir.1991).
89. See Finlinson, supra note 76, at 187.
90. See id; Elisabeth Pendley, Deregulation of the Energy Industry, 31
LAND & WATER L. REV. 27, 72-74 (1996).
91. See Charles M. Studness, The Calm before the Storm, 131 NO. 10 PUB.
UTIL. FORT. 37, 37 (1993).
92. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 84, at 1354; see also Portia Owen
Morrison & Christopher J. Townsend, Electric Deregulation: Challenges and
Opportunities for the Real Estate Industry, 13-JUN PROB. & PRop. 51, 51 (1999)
("Approximately 13 states have already passed electric deregulation legislation,
including Arizona, California, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
Pennsylvania and Virginia. Other states-Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey,
New York and Vermont- have issued comprehensive regulatory orders. Al-
most every other state is considering the issue either in its state house, before
its utility commission or both.").
93. See Peter Navarro, A Guidebook and Research Agenda for Restructur-
ing the Electricity Industry, 16 ENERGY L.J. 347, 381 (1995); Jim Rossi, The
Common Law "Duty to Serve" and Protection of Consumers in an Age of Compet-
itive Retail Public Utility Restructuring, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1233, 1321, FN 215
(1998).
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through blind auction.94 Under this model, the grid serves as a
"contract network that dispatches power on an integrated net-
work basis."95 The bilateral model differs in that there is no cen-
tral exchange market, power is traded via bilateral contracts
and electricity buyers are able to negotiate individually with
sellers.96 In this model, all sellers have non-discriminatory ac-
cess to the transmission grid, which provides an independent
commodity and "functions as a contract path to consummate
transactions with buyers."97
Merchant power plants are generating facilities established
under the competing transmission and distribution system.
They represent the newest form of energy project resulting from
the deregulation of electrical industry, under which all power
producers enjoy open access to transmit their power over trans-
mission and distribution facilities on a non-discriminatory basis
to reach wholesale as well as retail customers. 98 Merchant
plants are designed and financed on the basis of market analysis
by project sponsors and project lenders,99 and are operated in a
competitive market where long-term PPA are generally unavail-
able and electricity prices are determined by supply and de-
mand. 100 Without the benefit of having the investment secured
by a long term PPA, which provides an un-interruptible cash
flow to meet the operation costs and debt service, merchant
plants usually float with a much shorter-term market, often
from one hour to two or three years).10 Therefore, the project
company and operation contractor, rather than the traditional
retail customers, bear all of the risks correlated with develop-
ment, construction and operations, as well as the broader mar-
94. See id; Becky Kilbourne and George Sladoje, The Role of Power Ex-
changes in Restructured Electric Markets, 137 NO. 18 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 28, 32-
33 (1999).
95. See Peter Navarro, supra note 93, at 381.
96. See id; Sheila S. Hollis and Stephen L. Teichler, Collision or Coexis-
tence: the FERC, the CPUC, and Electric Restructuring, 133 NO. 18 Pub. Util.
Fort. 19, 19-20 (1995).
97. See id.
98. Carmen D. Legato, New Dynamics Shaping Electric Utilities Deals, 1
NO. 3 M & A LAw 1, 4 (1997).
99. See FERC Conference Finds Varying Opinions on How Much Natural
Gas Demand will Grow in the Northeast because of New Electric Generation and
How to Meet that Demand, 6/16/99 FOSTER ELECTRIC REP. 11, 19 (1999).
100. See Practicing Law Institute, Division of Investment Management, in
THE SEC SPEAKS 11 1999, at 9, 1383 (PLI Comp. L. & Practice Course Hand-
book Series, No. 1106, 1999).
101. See supra note 105, at 19; see also P. Chrisman Iribe, Retail Electricity
Competition, 5/25/99 Cong. Testimony, 1999 WL 16948451, at 5.
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ket risks associated with the general business climate.' 0 2 In
short, merchant plants are distinguished from traditional power
plants under typical project financing by being built and oper-
ated without the security of long-term PPAs, and they sell en-
ergy and capacity into an open market.10 3 As a result, merchant
plants are exposed to fluctuations in both sale volumes and
prices,' 04 and the project sponsors and project lenders bear
higher risks.'0 5
B. THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE CHALLENGE OF
PROJECT FINANCE
The Asian currency and debt crisis began with the devalua-
tion of the Thai baht in July 1997, spread to Indonesia and Ko-
rea, and destabilized the economies of Russia and Latin
America.106 As a result, excitement over Asia's potential for pro-
ject sponsors and project lenders soured, and the financial mar-
kets' appetite for emerging market exposure diminished.'0 7
Project lenders and investors became more sensitive to political,
legal and currency risks. 10 8 Because of currency devaluations,
certain high-profile projects undertaken in the previous years
were no longer financially feasible and some of them were per-
manently cancelled; many contractual arrangements proved to
be wobbly and some of them had to be renegotiated. 0 9 For ex-
ample, the purchasing tariff that Indonesia's utility paid for
power from project companies was higher than its retail price. 110
102. See id.
103. See Christopher Seiple, Merchant Plant Activity Set to Explode, 135
NO. 8 PuB. UTIL. FORT. 14, 15 (1997).
104. Power Report, Merchant Plants, Introducing a new generation, 6/10/99
PROJECT & TRADE FIN. 28, 29 (1999).
105. See Carl J. Levesque et al., News Digest, 137 NO. 16 PUB. UTIL. FORT.
12, 19 (1999).
106. See Review of the Year - Roundtable, the Rough with the Smooth 1998
Proved to be One of the Most Turbulent Years for Project Finance, PROJECT &
TRADE FIN. (1999), 1999 WL 10185078.
107. See Power Roundtable, Second Generation Moves Forward, 9/10/99
PRoJECT & TRADE FIN. 28 (1999); Morris Black, Meeting the Challenge (Industry
Overview), 6/1/98 PETROLEuM ECONOMIST 112, 115 (1998). But See East Asia
Needs to Invest 400 Billion USD in Power Sector Over 10 Years, AFX NEWS,
Apr. 27, 1999, 1999 WL 17040502. Although as a result of Asia's economic cri-
sis, GDP growth forecasts have fallen across the region and are reflected in a
diminished demand for power, Asia's long-term enormous need for power is un-
disputed. Id.
108. See Howard L. Moore, Shifting Ground, 7/1/98 GLOBAL FIN. 58 (1998).
109. See AHMED, supra note 4, at 3; Howard L. Moore, supra note 108, at
498, FN 12.
110. See Howard L. Moore, supra note 108.
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As a result, Indonesia's government attempted to compel the
project companies to renegotiate power tariffs by canceling or
suspending PPAs.111 In Pakistan, the government accused pro-
ject sponsors of using corrupt methods to secure their project
contracts. 11 2 Officials in the government urged a thirty-percent
reduction of the tariff." 3 Failing renegotiation to modify the
tariff level, they argued that the PPA could be terminated. 1 4
Conversely, China was regarded as being secluded from the
Asian currency crisis. 115 A series of power projects reached fi-
nancial close in 1997 and 1998, and it has had a relatively good
track record with its international projects." 6 Despite these re-
markable successes, the soundness of the Chinese PPAs has
been put into question by complaints that the annual tariff ad-
justment has not been approved as projected. 1 7 In short, it
seems that all that remains at issue is the tariff structure of the
PPAs.118
Two years after the currency crisis first hit Asia's financial
markets," 9 and as the notion of deregulation and competition
took hold state by state in the United States, 120 academics and
practitioners have been reconsidering the various structures
employed to effect project financings in emerging markets.' 21
Meanwhile, the Asian Development Bank is pushing the concept
of merchant power.' 22 Several countries, including China, 123
111. See id.
112. See Mary Watkins, Cover Story, Lights out for Power-Purchase Agree-
ment, 11/10/98 PROJECT & TRADE FIN. 23 (1998).
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See Cover Story, He Who Dares Wins, 6/10/99 PROJECT & TRADE FIN. 20
(1999).
116. See Watkins, supra note 112.
117. See id.; see also Cover Story, supra note 115 (quoting AES's Ruccius:
"There will be no more deals with a cost plus contract. And we are not prepared
to have annual tariff approvals, because we know they don't happen.").
118. See Watkins, supra note 112.
119. See supra note 115.
120. See Howard L. Moore, supra note 108.
121. See generally Harold F. Moore, supra note 37, at 475.
122. See id; see also East Asia Needs to Invest 400 Billion USD in Power
Sector over 10 Years, supra note 107 ("In China, the ADB has been working on
the competitive markets reform in Yunnan province and with the Northeastern
Power Network to prepare the transmission system for competitive markets.").
This was the logic underlying the "Qualified Facility" scheme in American Pa-
per Inst., Inc. v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402, 103 S.Ct. 1921
(1983).
123. Telephone Interview with Thomas T.M. Wu, Vice President of AES Ori-
ent, in Beijing, China (Oct. 24, 1999). China has started experimenting with six
different competitive systems within six different provinces.
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Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia, have, based on the belief
that deregulation of electricity generation would improve effi-
ciency and significantly reduce prices to retail utility consum-
ers, 124 outlined plans to move towards merchant power
systems.'25 The question remains, however, whether merchant
plants are a solution for project finance in developing countries,
and whether they provide a better approach than the long-term
PPA arrangement.
III. HYBRID MODELS: A POTENTIAL WAY OUT OF THE
DILEMMA
A. THE COMPETING TRANSMISSION ACCESS SYSTEM IN ASIA:
PROS AND CONS
In the wake of the Asian financial crisis, some practitioners
began to question the prudence of the expanded use of the con-
tractually based approach of project finance. 126 They argue that
the Asian crisis has highlighted the problem with reliance on
contractual arrangements, especially PPAs that hope to predict
tariff and guarantee payments over a twenty-year period.127
PPAs include complex, cumbersome and largely inflexible mech-
anisms and are costly to negotiate. 128 The project sponsors and
project lenders, seeking to prescribe fixed tariff structures in
PPAs that extend for more than twenty years, appear to put too
much faith and credit in the sacredness of the contractual ar-
rangements without having looked at the underlying fundamen-
tals, such as economic need. 129
Market risks associated with international power projects
are primarily addressed in the PPAs. During the Asian crisis,
however, many purchasing utilities found it difficult to continue
providing sufficient assurances on many of these key issues.' 30
For example, Indonesia and Pakistan have demonstrated that
124. See Legato, supra note 98.
125. See id; see also Malaysian Newspaper Highlights, AsiA PULSE, May 18,
1998, 1998 WL 2962157 ("[tlhe much-awaited power pooling system - also
known as the merchant power system - is expected to be implemented soon")
126. See AHMED, supra note 4, at 3.
127. See Watkins, supra note 112.
128. See Cordell Hull & Phillip Fletcher Milbank, For & Against, 12/10/98
PROJECT & TRADE FIN. 48 (1998), "[it can take longer to draft and finance a
PPA than it does to build a power plant. World Bank data shows that a signifi-
cant amount of project costs are absorbed by contract-related issues."
129. See World Bank, Industry Analysts Urge IPP's to Shift Their Focus to
Distribution, 3/5/99 INDEPENDENT POWER REP. 1 (1999), 1999 WL 11483251.
130. See id.
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they are quite susceptible to volatility in currency. 131 Thus,
even dollar-denominated PPAs may not seem advisable in a
country whose currency has the potential to fluctuate wildly,
and make the tariff rate absurd for retail utility consumers. 13 2
The key requirement for a financially viable power sector is
to have certainty of access to a market. 13 3 A competing trans-
mission system134 creates a transparent and stable market, al-
lowing project sponsors and lenders to assess the economic
viability of the project in relation to it's competitors by reference
to a dispatch merit order.135 Moreover, since the credit quality
of purchasing utilities remains a key barrier, 136 an "open access"
system offers the project companies the possibility of direct ac-
cess to more creditworthy retail utility customers.137 Therefore,
under a merchant power system, project companies will take
true commercial risks. 138 Latin American countries, which
adopted competitive market frameworks, provide a model for
the development of project financing in emerging markets. l3 9
"For any jurisdiction wishing to attract rapid and significant
generation investment, without placing undue burden on the
state or dominant utility, achieving a clear, stable and open elec-
tricity market may be the best way forward."140
On the other hand, some practitioners objected to the argu-
ment that the PPA structure should be replaced by merchant
power plants. To them, the idea that the projects in Asia could
be restructured as merchant power plants is "devastatingly
wrong," and the problems arising in the Asian crisis would be
"exaggerated" if the projects in question were operated under a
competitive market.' 41 Under the merchant power system, the
risk of inadequate market demand for power and market price of
power is allocated to the project sponsors and project lenders. 142
131. See id.
132. See Barbara Joiner & Suraj Bhatia, For & Against, 7/10/98 PROJECT &
TRADE FIN. 48, (1998).
133. See Hull & Milbank, supra note 128.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 93-95.
135. See id; Hull & Milbank, supra note 128.
136. See Black, supra note 107.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 95-95; see also Martin Stewart-
Smith, Private Financing and Infrastructure Provision in Emerging Markets, 26
LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 987, 993 (1995).
138. See Watkins, supra note 112.
139. See Black, supra note 107, "Latin America is stealing Asia's thunder,
attract more attention of power developers and financiers from Asia."
140. See Hull & Milbank, supra note 128.
141. See Harold F. Moore, supra note 37, FN 21.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 105-105.
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With regard to currency fluctuation risk, the major problem
caused by the Asian crisis, the PPA-structure provides for cur-
rency fluctuation adjustments. 143 Although the Asian crisis
warned that the devaluation risk in any international project fi-
nancing in an emerging market can never be completely elimi-
nated due to the mismatch between obligations denominated in
hard currency and revenues denominated in local currency, the
PPA-based model at least provides a mechanism to mitigate the
risk.144 However, this mechanism is unavailable under the
merchant power model. 145
In adopting the competitive market system, governments
seemed convinced that the new merchant power model would
encourage new investment, and provide electricity to the numer-
ous retail utility consumers at the lowest possible price.'46
However, because merchant plants are not secured by a long-
term contract that creates a revenue stream to match the costs
of operation and debt service,' 4v this system "may have a chil-
ling effect on the financial markets' underwriting of private-sec-
tor investment."148 Project sponsors and project lenders have
remained hesitant to move away from the contract-based PPA
model, which gives a degree of comfort and security.149 Thus,
long-term PPAs will still exist as the basis for most project lend-
ers financing power projects, especially in Asia.' 50
B. HYBRID MODELS OF PPA-BASED STRUCTURE AND
MERCHANT POWER SYSTEM
The trend towards merchant power is perhaps one of the
most significant developments in the global power industry. 51
Merchant power plants represent perhaps "the most efficient
and competitive way to create more reliable, lower-cost power
143. See supra text accompanying notes 61-64.
144. See Harold F. Moore, supra note 37, at 475-76.
145. Also, devaluation risk is difficult to shift to insurers, for example,
"neither MIGA nor the [Overseas Private Investment Corporation] insurance
protects against devaluation risk." See Stelwagon, supra note 2, at 57.
146. See Armstrong, supra note 5, at 500. The classic counter-statement to
this principle is the conclusion to FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S.
86, 73 S.Ct. 998 (1953).
147. See supra text accompanying notes 105-105.
148. See Armstrong, supra note 75, at 500.
149. See Watkins, supra note 112.
150. See Hull & Milbank, supra note 128.
151. See Michael Burr, Energy Finance, March 1, 1999 INDEP. ENERGY 10
(1999), 1999 WL 23757633.
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without the risk and cost falling on customers."15 2 However,
any greenfield project seeking to operate under the merchant
power system will be in competition with the established
projects, the short-term pricing mechanisms of a pure merchant
power system do not provide special consideration for the devel-
opment of a greenfield project which is burdened with start-up
costs that are not borne by the established facilities.'5 3 Thus, a
pure merchant power system may discourage long-term invest-
ment and tend to favor existing generators, whose cash flow al-
lows debt secured by a proven income stream. 54 As a result,
project lenders may shift away from greenfield projects to acqui-
sitions or upgraded projects.
Moreover, as indicated earlier, under a PPA-based project,
once a PPA had been signed, the greatest market risks were
shifted to the purchasing utility, and the remaining risk became
whether the purchasing utility was willing and able to honor
and perform its obligations under the contract.155 However, in
the merchant plant model, the market itself would decide the
short-term price of electric energy and capacity, and project
sponsors and lenders would finance a project based on their as-
sessment of economic need.' 5 6 Given the uncertainty inherent
in all forecasts, project lenders are cautious about financing
merchant plants without a contractually obligated cash flow. 157
As a compromise, a combination of corporate and project financ-
ing has been arranged for some merchant power projects, and
project lenders may allocate the higher risks to the project spon-
sors and project companies. 158 The tools include initial equity
contributions on the part of the sponsors as high as fifty-percent,
substantially higher debt service coverage requirements than
are found in PPA-based projects, and full funding of reserves for
debt service and operation and maintenance.' 5 9
152. NEMA Calls Merchant Plants Key to Competition, GAS DAILY, Aug. 26,
1999, Vol. 16, Issue 164 (quoting Craig Goodman, President & CEO of NEMA).
153. See Armstrong, supra note 75, at 501.
154. See id; Navarro, supra note 93, at 393.
155. See Keith W. Kriebel & Michael D. Hornstein, United States: Financing
Merchant Power Plants, July 1, 1999 INT'L FiN. L. REV. 3034 (1999), 1999 WL
23416698.
156. See id.
157. See Financing for True Merchant Plants Still Has Roadblocks, Say
Bankers, 2/5/99 INDEPENDENT POWER REP. 1 (1999), 1999 WL 11483115.
158. See id. Telephone interview with Linda Wong, Project Manager of the
AES Corporation Latin America group (Oct. 30, 1999). Project lenders may re-
quire letter of credits from project sponsors.
159. See Kriebel & Hornstein, supra note 155.
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A PPA has been considered the cornerstone of a typical pro-
ject financing transaction. 160 It has sought to allocate to
purchasing utilities and retail consumers such risks as change
in law and force majeure. 161 More importantly, by the mecha-
nism of "capacity payment" and "energy payment" in a take-or-
pay arrangement, PPA has been instrumental in providing pro-
ject company with guaranteed market, and an assured and sta-
ble revenue stream.162 Furthermore, a dollar-denominated PPA
could allocate currency volatility risks to the purchasing utili-
ties.163 However, the underlying economic rationale for PPA-
based structure does not introduce incentives for project compa-
nies and purchasing utilities to improve efficiency and reduce
prices to captive consumers.' 64 The project company and
purchasing utility enter into a "regulatory bargain" on the un-
derstanding that reasonable costs would be recovered in tariff
rates. 165 Thus, with few exceptions, the "cost-plus-pricing" regu-
lation allows project companies to increase their tariff rates to
the extent necessary to recover increased costs. 166 In addition,
because of the take-or-pay contractual obligations, purchasing
utilities may be unable to follow the rules of market economy,
such as giving priority to the lower marginal cost facilities to sell
their generation, and thus affording consumers the lowest price
among the power producers. As a result, project companies have
few incentives to minimize costs because there is little threat of
competition. Moreover, the rigid tariff formula in PPAs based
the "cost-plus-pricing" regulation performs normally well in
price stable periods but badly in times of high inflation, because
it fails to limit power producers to a reasonable return on capital
and led to excessive investments.167 Since high electricity price
contributes to a higher inflation, and a strong reaction from util-
160. See Burr, supra note 151.
161. See Hull & Milbank, supra note 128; see also supra notes 37-43 and
accompanying text.
162. See id; see also supra text accompanying notes 48-60.
163. See supra text accompany notes 61-65.
164. See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconstituting the Natural Gas In-
dustry from Wellhead to Burnertip, 9 ENERGY L.J. 1 (1988).
165. See John Burritt McArthur, Cost Responsibility or Regulatory Indul-
gence for Electricity's Stranded Costs? 47 AM. U. L. REV. 775, 854 (1998). See
generally Judge Starr's concurring opinion in Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v.
FERC, 810 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
166. See Richard J. Pierce, Reconsidering the Roles of Regulation and Com-
petition in the Natural Gas Industry, 97 HARv. L. REV. 345, 359 (1983).
167. See Bernard S. Black & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Choice between Mar-
kets and Central Planning in Regulating the U.S. Electricity Industry, 93
COLUM. L. REv. 1339, 1344 (1993); Navarro, supra note 93, at 350.
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ity consumer groups, these may force purchasing utilities to re-
spond by suppressing rates below what power plants otherwise
required to return their capital. 168 This in turn will place the
PPA in a shaky situation.169
Even though the merchant power has become a dominant
system, there are very few countries in which merchant power is
the only supply basis for the power market. 170 For example,
when adopting the spot market system in its electrical industry,
the United Kingdom has established a "renewable set-aside"
program to help finance renewable energy industries (such as
wind energy plants, hydroelectric dams), requiring more capital
investment and longer construction period.17 ' To help the pri-
vate investors overcome the obstacles to the development of
power projects under the merchant power system, especially the
financial difficulties involved in greenfield projects, some hybrid
models might better serve foreign invested projects. In hybrid
models the PPAs cover only a portion of the output of a project,
or the total output but only a given period of time, leaving the
remainder to be sold on the open market.172
1. The Two-Step Approach
Greenfield power projects require high front-end expendi-
tures. In addition, classic project financing usually provides
commercial term loans of no more than seven years of duration
following the completion of construction. This means that the
project company has to pay off all interest and principal pay-
ments within seven years after the generation facilities enter
commercial operation. As a result, in order to maintain a suffi-
cient cash flow required to ensure debt service, the tariff of a
greenfield plant is usually high during the period of the greatest
amortization of the project's debt, such as the first seven years.
And the project company will be able to lower its tariff only after
repaying interest and principal. Therefore, in a competitive
market, it is highly unlikely that a plant in its first year of oper-
168. See Navarro, supra note 93, at 351.
169. See generally Nassar, supra note 25, at 65. Supply of services such as
electricity, water, telecommunications, or transportation are of public concern
and politically sensitive. Providing these services "for an exaggerated charge is
not a politically desirable situation for any government, be it a developed or
developing country."
170. See supra note 107.
171. See Armstrong, supra note 75, at 472; see also Black & Pierce, supra
note 167 on negawatt programs in the U.S..
172. See Kriebel & Hornstein, supra note 155.
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ation will be able to compete effectively against another plant in
its eighth year of operation. A solution would be to divide the
whole commercial operation period of the power plant, usually
twenty to thirty years or longer, into two phases: repayment and
post-repayment periods. During the repayment period, the
purchasing utility and project company would enter into a PPA
to offer protection to the greenfield plant and provide cash flow
to match the debt service. The PPA will terminate upon the ter-
mination of the loan agreements. In the post-repayment period,
the power plant will enter into competitive market, and project
sponsors will no longer have the benefit of having that invest-
ment secured by the regulated utility rate base. This solution is
based on the theory that compared to lenders, the investors tend
to take a long-term view of their investment, and they would be
willing to take more risk in exchange for higher returns in the
future.173
2. The Two-Tier Approach
This approach is based on the two-portion electricity pricing
system of "capacity payment" and "energy payment." As dis-
cussed above, the capacity payment is designed to recover the
fixed costs of the project, including construction costs, fixed oper-
ation and maintenance costs, and financial costs. 174 The energy
payment is designed to compensate the project company for all
variable costs of operating the project, including cost of fuel and
variable operation and maintenance costs associated with the
actual production of energy. 175 Although the tariff structures
may vary among projects, the combined tariff of capacity and en-
ergy payment would be served to recover all costs and provide a
stable revenue steam to the project company over the term of the
PPA's.176
The two-tier approach will separate the combined tariff of
capacity and energy payment. In addition, it will put sharehold-
ers' investment equity return into the energy payment, although
it is sometimes covered by the capacity payment. Under this ap-
proach, the project company and the purchasing utility enter
into a PPA that only recovers the fixed costs of the project. In
173. See AHMED, supra note 4, at 8.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 51-60; see also Robert Thornton
Smith, supra note 46, at 210.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 51-60; see also Stelwagon, supra
note 2, at 53.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 51-60; see also Robert Thornton
Smith, supra note 46, at 210.
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other words, the PPA will only guarantee the capacity payment
portion of the tariff. The energy payment portion can be recov-
ered in the competitive market. For example, assume that in
order for a project company to recover all of its capacity and en-
ergy payment, it has to operate 5,500 hours per year; assume
among the 5,500 hours, 3,500 hours would cover the capacity
payment. The purchasing utility will have an obligation to
purchase the electricity produced from 3,500 hours of operation.
The remaining 2,000 hours' output would be available for sale
into the open market on condition that its price is lower than the
competitors of the project company. On the other hand, the pro-
ject company would have chance to sell more than 5,500 hours'
output if its price is competitive.
This approach will provide equal competitive opportunities
to new greenfield plants and existing facilities. By providing the
capacity payment, this approach ensures that sufficient reve-
nues will be available to cover all debt service and fixed opera-
tion and maintenance costs. Thus it would relieve the burdens
placed on greenfield plants of high front-end expenditures and
loan repayment, and provide the project lenders with an ade-
quate degree of comfort to finance a project. On the other hand,
the capacity payment will only create a regular cash flow neces-
sary for the project to meet its payment obligations under its
loan agreements. As for the shareholders, this approach guar-
antees recovery of their capital contribution. For returns on eq-
uity, shareholders have to take market risks.
CONCLUSION
The most significant trend in the worldwide reform of the
electric utility industry is the move towards the implementation
of a "fully unbundled, competitive electricity market" model.
But before policymakers of developing countries rush to embrace
the merchant power model in the electric industry, they should
carefully evaluate its advantages and disadvantages. Policy-
makers should also be aware of limits of the merchant power
model. In situations where political, legal, and currency risks
are likely to be high, the central features of a PPA, certainty of
market and of price, still make the PPA relevant for a considera-
ble portion of power financing. However, the somehow flawed
underlying economic rationale for such an approach may even-
tually dilute the effectiveness of the PPA. While the Asian fi-
nancial crisis illustrated that reliance solely on the "one-stop
shopping" afforded by PPAs may bring about some problems, the
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pure merchant power model may not be the only effective solu-
tion either. Hybrid models, which employ modified PPA-struc-
ture to provide the financial security base for a part of the
electric power purchase, and also use merchant power to intro-
duce incentives to improve efficiency and reduce prices, may
serve as an effective and a viable alternative.

